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Predictive coding theory (Srinivasan et al., 1982; Mumford, 1992; Rao and Ballard, 1999) claims
that the function of the hierarchical organization in the cortex is to reconcile representations and
predictions of sensory input at multiple levels. It does this because the dynamics of neural activity
is geared toward minimizing the error: the difference between the input representation at each
level and the prediction originating from a higher level representation. In other words, the neural
activities in the whole hierarchy settle to a state where the difference between the prediction and the
representation of sensory input isminimal. This view has gained enormous popularity, and research
applying this theoretical framework to explain various kinds of empirical data has flourished since
then (Friston, 2010; Clark, 2013b).
Predictive coding theory is a mechanistic theory: it aims to describe the neurocomputational
machinery. Hence, merely describing phenomenological data in the terminology of the theoretical
framework is not sufficient. The theory should allow the empirical data to be explained
by neurocomputational mechanisms and the proposed mechanisms should be testable at the
neurophysiological level. To do this, the details of the mechanisms, especially how the errors are
computed and minimized, need to be articulated in neuronal terms. Note that error signals at
each level influence neural activities in two ways in this framework. First, they are fed forward
to the higher level(s) where they influence the neural activities of the higher level representation(s).
The resulting predictions are in turn fed back to the lower level. Second, at the same time, the
error signals also influence the response properties of the neurons at the same level and the
representation of the sensory input is modified. The updating of the prediction and the changes
to the lower level representation are made to improve their match. Through this two-way process
of reconciliation the error signals are minimized. However, the possibility of simultaneous changes
in both higher level prediction and lower level representations, and mixed populations of error
neurons and sensory representation neurons within the same local circuit, give rise to a “multiple
choices” problem. This problem is significant when using empirical data such as fMRI, EEG, and
unit recordings to test the theory. For example, how do we determine whether a single unit being
recorded is an error neuron or a neuron representing input? Note that in the model of Rao and
Ballard (1999), endstopping cells function as error neurons because they signal the sudden stop
of the line segment while continuation of the line is predicted. On the contrary, Kapadia et al.
(1995) showed that the neural response to a line segment increases when collinear line segments
are presented outside of the classic receptive field. In the former case, the increase of the neural
signal is explained because of the mismatch of the input with the prediction while in the latter case,
the increase would be explained because the input matches the prediction. How is this apparent
inconsistency of explanations resolved? Or consider Kanizsa’s illusory surface (Kanizsa, 1955). It
has been shown that neurons in lower level visual cortex are activated at the location of illusory
contours (von der Heydt et al., 1984). Are they considered as error neurons or representation
neurons? In other words, are they active because of the mismatch between the input and the
prediction giving rise to error signal, or because the representation signal is modified to match
the prediction? The same applies to recordings of the activity of a population of neurons such as
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those obtained via fMRI: is an increase of the fMRI signal
due to an increased error signal or to changes in the input
representation? And does the process of reconciliation between
the lower level representation and the prediction result in
silencing of error neurons and if so, is this detectable in the
data? The last question is particularly crucial because it has
been suggested that reduction of neural signals at the lower
level can be explained in terms of error minimization (Murray
et al., 2002; Summerfield et al., 2008; den Ouden et al., 2009;
Alink et al., 2010; Todorovic et al., 2011; Kok et al., 2012b).
To overcome these problems of testability, the theory must be
articulated in sufficient neurophysiological detail, particularly
in regard to the mechanisms of error computation and
minimization.
Predictive coding theory is inspired by a systematic pattern
of connectivity, both within individual areas of neocortex and
within the feedforward and feedback projections between areas,
specific to layer location and type of source and target neurons
(Maunsell and van Essen, 1983). These anatomical patterns
suggest that neurocomputational processes are based on a
characteristic neural circuit comprising intra-areal and inter-
areal connections, and that this neural circuit as a module is
iterated in a hierarchical fashion. The iterated circuit block that
Rao and Ballard (1999) proposed is an example of this “canonical
microcircuit,” an elementary neural circuit that is constructed in a
specific way and works as a principal module of the computation.
The next step toward testability is to specify how the proposed
neural computation is accomplished using more realistic cortical
neurons and circuitry. A paper by Bastos et al. (2012) addressed
this very issue by first presenting the set of equations that
implement the dynamics of predictive coding and then matching
the terms in the equations to the neural sub-types in the different
layers. However, the neurocomputational mechanisms to realize
predictive coding theory are still in debate (den Ouden et al.,
2012; Eriksson et al., 2012; Gotts et al., 2012; Kok et al., 2012a;
Clark, 2013a,b; Rauss and Pourtois, 2013; Summerfield and de
Lange, 2014). In this paper, through the analysis of the logic
behind the Bastos model, we raise some issues in regard to
the critical question for the predictive coding theory: what, in
neuronal terms, is an error signal and how is it computed? We
consider this question as a central issue of the predictive coding
theory.
Their point of departure is the generative model: an iterative
and centrifugal sequence of “causes” (v) and “states” (x). The
cause in the parent level (i + 1) creates the state in the child
level (i), which in turn becomes the parent level of the next
child level (i−1). Then, they created a feedback system by
introducing bi-directional interactions between themodules. The
conditional expectation of state and cause and their errors are
computed at each level of the hierarchy, the error signals are
sent to the higher level, and the expectation signals are sent
to the lower level. The expectations and the errors for both
causes and states are denoted by µ and ξ respectively (their
Equation 1). Hence, there are four main variables per level, µv,
µx, ξv, and ξx. (Each of these variables is multi-dimensional,
according to the dimensionality of the input representation at
each level.)
By analysing the sequential processes in Equation 1 and
the known neural types and their connections in neocortex,
they pointed out the “remarkable correspondence” between the
sequential processes in the equations and the neural architecture.
Accordingly, they proposed a mapping between the processes in
Equation 1 and a neural microcircuit (their Figure 5), according
to which distinct neuron sub-types function as the terms µv, µx,
ξv, and ξx.
The operation of the circuit is as follows:
1. The prediction signal, g(i + 1) at level i + 1 is created as a
function of µv(i + 1) and µx(i + 1) at layer 5/6 and is sent to
the lower level (i).
2. At the lower level, the error signal, ξv(i + 1), is computed at
layer 2/3 by comparing g(i+ 1) with µv(i).
3. The error signal, ξv, is sent to the layer 4 of the higher level via
feedforward connections (and re-represented by the excitatory
neurons at that layer).
4. The error signal of state, ξx(i), in layer 4 is updated according
to the expectations of cause and state at the same level.
5. The error signals help to update the expectations of cause
and state (µv and µx) by modifying the excitatory neurons at
layer 2/3.
6. The expectations of cause and state (µv and µx) are re-
represented at layer 5/6 to create the prediction signal, g to
be sent to the lower level (step 1).
In the proposed framework, the error is the difference between
the lower level representation and the prediction. Hence, the
error is,
error = “representation”minus “prediction”
This corresponds to the error computation occurring in the
superficial layer (step 2), subtracting g(i + 1) from µv(i). This
formulation appears to cause some problems.
In their model, the feedback signal, g, is sent from the
layer 5/6 neurons (µv and µx) at the higher level. These are
excitatory cells. It is, then, not clear how the subtraction can
be made when this signal reaches the superficial layer at the
lower level. Note that while the feedback signal sent from the
higher level is g (Figure 1A corresponding to their Figure 5
right; at bottom), when it reaches the top layer at the lower
level, it is -g (Figure 1B corresponding to their Figure 5 right;
at top) without any explanation of the reversal of the sign.
Although they suggested the involvement of inhibitory neurons
in L1 earlier, among the diversity of distinct types of inhibitory
neurons (Petilla Interneuron Nomenclature Group et al., 2008)
many of them can “provide strong mono-synaptic inhibition to
L2/3” (page 699) and there are no clear reasons given why the
L1 inhibitory neurons should take the role of reversing the sign
of g. Furthermore, they did not explicitly specify the function of
the sign reversal by inhibitory neurons in Figure 5. Moreover,
they also pointed out that (page 699) “feedback connections can
both facilitate and suppress firing in lower hierarchical areas.”
How can this dualistic effect be exhibited by this circuit? Note
that certain formulations of predictive coding have been shown
to be functionally equivalent to a biased competition framework
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Bastos et al. (2012) proposed that neurons in layer 6 represent expectation of cause, µv, and expectation of state, µx , which send out feedback
signals to the lower level. In their diagram, this output signal is expressed as a function g (red). (B) When this signal arrives at the lower level, the feedback signal is
expressed as −g (red) in their proposal without any explanation of the reversal of the sign. Note that, to compute the error, the subtraction is done between the lower
level representation signal, µv, and the prediction factor g, (ξv=µv − g) and, hence, the negative signal of g is necessary. However, if the neurons, µv and µx are
pyramidal (excitatory) cells as proposed by Bastos et al. this subtraction cannot be performed. (C) The error, “representation – feedback,” can create either positive or
negative values. However, the neuron that represents the error in the proposed circuit of Bastos et al. would not create action potentials when the error value is
negative. Hence, the neuron is not capable to signal the error when the prediction factor g is larger than the representation signal, µv. To deal with the positive and
negative error signals properly, “two distinct populations of neurons to signal errors, one for positive and another for negative errors” (Rao and Ballard, 1999) may be
necessary. For example, the inhibitory neuron, η
(i)
µ , shown here reverses the sign of the feedforward representation signal, µ
(i), to compute the “negative” error, ξn
(=g−µ(i)). The other inhibitory neuron, η
(i+ 1)
g , reverses the sign of g so that the “positive” error can be expressed as a neural signal in ξp (=µ
(i)
− g).
(Spratling, 2008) in which the error signal is computed within
the upper level rather than at the lower level. Therefore, it may be
possible, that with the different mapping of variables to neuronal
sub-types, the biologically implausible top-down inhibition for
subtraction is avoided.
Next, consider how the error signal is represented. Assume
that the prediction signal fed back to the lower level is stronger
than the representation signal. As their definition of the error
is “representation minus prediction,” the error value becomes
negative. However, they claim that the error neuron, ξv, is
a pyramidal cell and, hence, ξv(i + 1) in their Figure 5 is
always excitatory. In other words, this circuit cannot create
an explicit “negative signal” that is sent to the higher level.
There could be two ways to solve this problem. One way to
signal the “negativity” is to assume that there is a baseline
level of activity in ξv(i + 1) and the negativity is expressed
by the decrease of the output signal ξv(i + 1) below the
baseline. If this is the case, the error is minimized the most
when the activities of the error neurons reach the baseline
state, not when they become silent. Having a certain level of
baseline activity means that the energy consumption by the
error neuron is not necessarily minimal when the error is
minimized. This is quite a different view to that of minimizing
(or silencing) the activity of error neurons, even though the latter
view is a central component of predictive coding theory. For
example, Friston (2005) wrote, “High-level predictions explain
away prediction error and tell the error units to ‘shut up’.”
(p. 829), and Kok et al. (2012a) wrote, “high-level predictions
explain away prediction error, thus silencing error neurons”
(p. 265). A second way to signal negativity, which retains
the concept of minimizing error neuron activity, is a neural
circuit with more explicit error computation to deal with
positive and negative errors (Figure 1C). Note that Rao and
Ballard (1999) suggested the possibility of such computation
of positive and negative errors (p. 85). If this is the case,
the proposed neural circuit by Bastos et al. is not an explicit
representation of how the error computation is achieved in the
real biological system. Alternatively, it has been suggested that
error minimization can be done by a divisive operation (Koch
and Poggio, 1999) which might avoid the need for negative
error signals. However, this requires the equilibrium state to
be represented by baseline activities, which leads to the same
problem discussed above.
Intra-areal microcircuits and their inter-areal bi-directional
connections in cortex follow a systematic, recurring pattern that
suggests a hierarchically iterated canonical signal processing.
How exactly these circuits process information is an outstanding
question of great importance. Predictive coding theory is
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 September 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 111
Kogo and Trengove Is predictive coding theory testable?
currently a highly influential theory for cognitive function and
behavior, and one of the plausible theoretical frameworks that
may explain the signal processing architecture of the cortex. A
“translation” of the terms in the mathematical formulation of the
theory into neurophysiological and neuroanatomical parameters
would have a strong impact on the precise design of experiments
involving neural recordings and psychophysics. The analysis of
the neurocomputational model by Bastos et al. presented here
suggests that the way in which error signals are computed is
the central issue for testing the theory, and that there is still
a gap between the theoretical formalism and concrete neural
mechanisms.
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